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A long line of work emphasizes the correla-
tion between institutions and economic perfor-
mance (Adam Smith 1776; W. Arthur Lewis 
1955; Douglass C. North 1990). Rich countries 
have laws that provide incentives to engage in 
productive economic activity. Investors rely on 
secure property rights, facilitating investment in 
human and physical capital; government power 
is balanced and restricted by an independent 
judiciary; contracts are enforced effectively, 
supporting private economic transactions.
Recent research moves from correlation to 
causation by observing that countries whose 
colonizers established strong property rights 
hundreds of years ago have, on average, much 
higher levels of income today than countries 
whose colonizers did not (Daron Acemoglu, 
Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson 2001). 
Since a country’s colonial origin—literally 
determined centuries ago—can in no meaning-
ful way be said to be caused by its present-day 
level of income, the nature of countries’ colonial 
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origins enables researchers to estimate the causal 
impact of property rights on long-run economic 
outcomes. Differences in the legal tradition that 
countries inherited from their colonial masters 
also have a long-run impact on economic out-
comes. Countries with English common law ori-
gins provide investors with stronger protection 
and are less prone to government ownership and 
regulation than countries with civil law origins (Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Andrei Shleifer 2008). In turn, common law 
countries have greater financial development, 
less corruption, smaller informal economies, 
and lower unemployment.
Case studies seem to suggest that institutions 
also exert a causal influence on economic out-
comes over periods of time somewhat shorter 
than the centuries-long span emphasized by 
the colonial and legal origins literature. For 
instance, following the Armistice of 1953, Korea 
broke into two separate nations with similar lev-
els of income, almost identical ethnic and cul-
tural makeup, but starkly different institutional 
arrangements of the economy. North Korea 
resorted to central planning while South Korea 
relied on property rights and markets (with a 
healthy dose of state intervention). More than 50 
years later South Korea’s income per capita is 
more than ten times as large as North Korea’s. 
The divergence of the East and West German 
economies following the partition of Germany 
after World War II ostensibly provides another 
piece of evidence in favor of the view that insti-
tutions play the dominant role.
While institutions undoubtedly affect eco-
nomic outcomes, the macroeconomic policies 
that governments choose to implement may 
exert just as much influence on the trajectory 
of their economies as the broader institutional 
framework within which those policy decisions 
take place. As a matter of arithmetic, long-run 
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income levels are the sum of a series of short- 
and medium-run growth rates that are heavily 
influenced by fiscal, monetary, and exchange 
rate policy (to name a few). This article demon-
strates the relevance of the point by examining 
a very different kind of policy experiment from 
the ones in the existing literature on institutions 
and growth.
In contrast to the examples of North and South 
Korea and East and West Germany, we examine 
a pair of countries—Barbados and Jamaica—
whose income levels diverge over a 40-year 
stretch in spite of no obvious differences in the 
institutional arrangements of their economies at 
the beginning of the observation period.
I. Standards of Living in Barbados and Jamaica
Barbados and Jamaica are both former British 
colonies, small island economies, and predomi-
nantly inhabited by the descendants of Africans 
who were brought to the Caribbean to cultivate 
sugar. As former British colonies, Barbados and 
Jamaica inherited almost identical political, 
economic, and legal institutions: Westminster 
Parliamentary democracy, constitutional protec-
tion of property rights, and legal systems rooted 
in English common law. Yet, as Figure 1 demon-
strates, the standard of living in the two countries 
diverged in the roughly 40-year period following 
their independence from Great Britain. 
Figure 1 plots the natural logarithm of an 
index of real GDP per capita (measured in US 
dollars) in Barbados and Jamaica from 1960 
through 2002. By construction, the value of the 
index is one in 1960 so that the natural log of 
the index is zero in 1960. While Barbados has 
not exactly experienced a growth miracle, its 
economy performed reasonably well over the 
42-year period and substantially better than 
Jamaica’s. To be exact, by 2002, the natural log 
of the index is 0.917 for Barbados and 0.356 for 
Jamaica, so that the average growth rate of real 
GDP per capita for Barbados over the entire 
sample is 2.2 percent per year (0.917 divided 
by 42) versus 0.8 percent per year for Jamaica (0.356 divided by 42).
One particularly striking feature of Figure 1 
is the sharp decline in Jamaica’s standard of liv-
ing that sets in after 1972. Of course, the first oil 
price shock in 1973 precipitated a general slow-
down in world economic growth, but the central 
point (laid out in more detail later in the paper) 
is that growth in Jamaica slowed more dramati-
cally than it did in Barbados. While Jamaica’s 
economy contracted at a rate of 2.3 percent per 
year from 1972 to 1987, Barbados, whose econ-
omy has a similar structure (see Table 1) and was 
subject to the same external shocks, grew by 1.2 
percent per year. In other words, for a 15-year 
period income per head in Barbados grew by 3.5 
percentage points faster than it did in Jamaica.
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Figure 1. Standards of Living in Barbados and Jamaica Diverge after Independence
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Turning from growth rates to levels gives a 
tangible sense of the impact of these growth-rate 
differentials on long-run standards of  living. In 
1960 real GDP per capita was $3,395 in Barbados 
and $2,208 in Jamaica. In 2002 Barbados’s 
GDP per capita was $8,434 while Jamaica’s 
was $3,165. The $1,187 income gap that existed 
between Barbados and Jamaica around the time 
of independence now stands at $5,269 dollars. 
Put another way, the income gap between the 
two countries now exceeds Jamaica’s level of 
GDP per capita. 
Since their initial conditions were similar at 
the time of independence, it stretches credulity 
to argue that Barbados and Jamaica diverged 
because of differences in colonial origins, legal 
origins, geography, or some other exogenous 
feature of their economies. We argue below 
that the explanation for the divergence lies not 
with differences in institutions but differences 
in macroeconomic policy.
II. Institutions
Jamaica won its independence from Britain in 
1962, Barbados in 1966. At the time they became 
sovereign nations, both countries possessed the 
two institutional characteristics that the litera-
ture identifies as critical to long-run prosperity: 
strong constitutional protection of private prop-
erty and English common law. A brief review of 
the islands’ colonial histories verifies the state-
ment in the preceding sentence.
The English settled Barbados in 1627 and 
wrested Jamaica from the Spanish in 1655. 
Both islands entered the modern era as planta-
tion economies that produced sugar and other 
agricultural commodities using slave labor (Eric 
Williams 1970). By the end of the eighteenth 
century, African slaves comprised more than 
85 percent of the populations of Barbados and 
Jamaica. Slavery was abolished in the British 
West Indies in 1834, and following World War 
I the region began a process of “constitutional 
decolonization” that led the islands down a grad-
ual, if difficult, path toward greater self-govern-
ment (Trevor Munroe 1972). Reporting on his 
visit to the region in 1922, Major E. F. L. Wood, 
Britain’s Under Secretary of State for Colonies 
wrote: 
“The whole history of the African popula-
tion of the West Indies inevitably drives 
them towards representational institu-
tions fashioned after the British Model. 
Transplanted by the slave trade or other 
circumstances to foreign soil, losing in the 
process their social system, language and 
traditions. … Small wonder if they look for 
political growth to be the only course and 
pattern that they know, and aspire to share 
in what has been the particularly British 
gift of representational institutions” 
(Wood 1921). 
Three subsequent empirical observations 
demonstrate the accuracy of Wood’s predic-
tion that the British West Indies (Barbados and 
Jamaica in particular) were destined to establish 
institutions that mirrored the mother country. 
First, as sovereign nations, both Barbados 
and Jamaica organized their governments as 
parliamentary democracies in the Westminster-
Whitehall tradition (Anthony Payne 1993). 
Since independence, Barbados and Jamaica 
have maintained two-party political systems 
and consistently held free and fair elections with 
no unconstitutional transfers of power. While 
sporadic violence often accompanies elections 
in Jamaica, neither Barbados nor Jamaica has 
Table 1—Barbados and Jamaica Have Similar Economies
Barbados Jamaica
Exports as percent GDP 58.4 50.0
Imports as percent GDP 68.6 60.7
Agriculture as percent GDP 3.7 5.7
Industry as percent GDP 18.0 33.1
Services as percent GDP 78.3 61.2
Population 300,000 2,700,000
Area (square miles) 166 4,244
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suffered a coup or civil war, and both countries 
have a free and vocal press. Four postindepen-
dence elections in Jamaica resulted in the  ruling 
party peacefully turning over power to the 
opposition. Three such transitions occurred in 
Barbados. 
Second, the constitutions of Barbados and 
Jamaica explicitly protect private property. The 
joint parliamentary committee that drafted 
Jamaica’s constitution was chaired by Norman 
Manley—a lawyer, Rhodes Scholar, and father 
of the nation’s future prime minister. Discussing 
the constitution in front of Jamaica’s House of 
Parliament on 23 January 1962, Manley says: 
“We have put into this constitution a clause 
which provides that property may not be, 
in effect, arbitrarily acquired. Property 
is protected in that it can only be taken 
under a law which has been passed. And 
when so taken, it must be taken in accor-
dance with the terms of that law. What the 
law provides for compensation, you must 
get. …[I]t is of the highest importance for a 
country like Jamaica to let the world know 
that…people can come here to invest… 
fully protected by the laws of the land…” 
(Manley 1962, 306).
Barbados, which attained full independence 
four years after Jamaica, adopted a constitu-
tion with an effectively identical coverage of 
private property. Both constitutions assert that 
property cannot be compulsorily acquired 
except under written law that describes a pro-
cedure for determining and providing compen-
sation and grants claimants the right of appeal 
to a court (Chapter 3, Section 16, of Barbadian 
Constitution; Chapter 3, Section 18, of Jamaican 
Constitution). The constitutions also delineate 
similar sets of exceptions to this clause, such as 
cases where property is acquired in satisfaction 
of a tax, property is in a condition dangerous to 
the health of others, or property is acquired to 
pay debt of the insolvent.
Third, Barbados and Jamaica adopted legal 
systems based on English common law (Rose-
Marie Antoine 1999). Describing the essence of 
this adoption to the Philadelphia Bar Association 
in 1967, Manley says: “As to the law, we took over 
the English common law holus bolus. But what 
was more important we took over the structure 
and machinery which England built up for the 
administration of justice” (Manley 1967, 340). 
For most of their histories, both countries shared 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
England as their highest court of appeals.
Because Barbados and Jamaica possess simi-
lar economic institutions and legal systems, nei-
ther the property-rights nor legal-origins theory 
of long-run income determination can explain 
their postindependence divergence. Although 
the institutional structures of Barbados and 
Jamaica are very close, the same cannot be said 
of their approaches to macroeconomic policy.
III. Macroeconomic Policies
When Jamaica gained independence in 1962 
the Jamaican Labor Party (JLP) held a parlia-
mentary majority. For the next ten years the JLP 
remained in power and GDP per capita grew at a 
rate of 5.4 percent per year, with the lion’s share 
of growth stemming from two principal sources: 
strong US growth in the 1960s created a robust 
export market for Jamaican bauxite; and rising 
incomes in North America boosted growth in 
Jamaica’s tourism industry.
But all was not well. In classic Dutch Disease 
fashion, growth in the bauxite sector drove up 
the relative price of nontradeables, reducing 
the competitiveness of Jamaica’s agricultural 
sector and precipitating an exodus of workers 
from the countryside to the cities (Carl Stone 
and Stanislaw Wellisz 1993). Because of strong 
unions, wages in other sectors did not adjust 
downward to absorb the excess labor released 
from agriculture (Caribbean Policy Research 
Institute 2005). Consequently, during its first 
decade of independence Jamaica experienced 
the odd combination of strong growth coupled 
with an unemployment rate that rose from 13 
percent in 1962 to 23.2 percent in 1972. 
Rising unemployment, income inequality, 
and the attendant societal tensions proved too 
much for the JLP at the ballot box. In 1972 the 
People’s National Party (PNP) rose to power 
under the leadership of Prime Minister Michael 
Manley (son of Norman) and the promise of 
“democratic socialism.” The two cornerstones of 
democratic socialism and the PNP’s economic 
policies were “self-reliance” and “social jus-
tice.” Self-reliance translated as extensive state 
intervention in the economy. The PNP nation-
alized companies, erected import barriers, and 
imposed strict exchange controls (R. DeLisle 
Worrell 1987). Social justice meant income 
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redistribution through job creation programs, 
housing development schemes, and subsidies on 
basic food items. 
Whatever merits the PNP’s economic program 
may have had, it was expensive. Government 
spending rose from 23 percent of GDP in 1972 
to 45 percent in 1978. Revenue did not keep pace 
with the rise in expenditure. From 1962 through 
1972 Jamaica’s average fiscal deficit was 2.3 
percent of GDP (see Table 2). In contrast, from 
1973 to 1980 the average fiscal deficit was 15.5 
percent of GDP! The PNP financed much of 
the deficit by borrowing directly from the Bank 
of Jamaica. Predictably, inflation rose. From 
1962 to 1972 inflation averaged 4.4 percent per 
year. By 1980 inflation was 27 percent per year, 
investment had collapsed (to 14 percent of GDP 
down from 26 percent in 1972), and the PNP 
was voted out of power. 
Because Jamaica’s reversal of fortune coin-
cided with the oil price shock of 1973 and the 
onset of worldwide stagflation, it is tempting 
to blame the country’s downward spiral on 
external events. While many have done so (see 
Manley 1987), even a cursory comparison with 
Barbados makes it difficult for an objective 
observer to embrace that conclusion.
The inflation rate in Barbados also spiked 
in the early 1970s, hitting a peak of 39 percent 
in 1975, but Barbados’s policy response to the 
external shocks that precipitated the spike could 
not have been more different from Jamaica’s. 
First of all, Barbados avoided nationalization, 
kept state ownership to a minimum, and adopted 
an outward-looking growth strategy (Courtney 
Blackman 2006, 390). Second, instead of tak-
ing an accommodative stance that delayed the 
inevitable retrenchment needed to adjust to 
higher energy prices, policymakers in Barbados 
kept government spending under control. While 
the fiscal deficit in Barbados did climb to 7.7 
percent of GDP in 1973, by 1978 that number 
was down to 2.9 percent. Since much of defi-
cit financing comes from the central bank, by 
extension, Barbados also ran a tighter monetary 
ship than Jamaica. Table 2 summarizes the 
net result of the difference in macroeconomic 
policy in Barbados and Jamaica over the two 
periods. 
IV. Exchange Rate Policies
In 1975 Barbados pegged its currency to the 
US dollar at a parity of B$2: US$1. The parity 
came under threat when Barbados suffered a 
deep recession in the early 1990s and real GDP 
per capita contracted by 5.1 percent per year 
from 1989 to 1992. In the midst of the crisis 
in 1991, Barbados entered formal negotiations 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
to request financial assistance. Among other 
things, the IMF recommended devaluation to 
stimulate production and return the economy to 
full employment. Deeply attached to the stabil-
ity of their currency, the Barbadians resisted the 
recommendation. Instead of devaluing, the gov-
ernment began a set of negotiations with employ-
ers, unions, and workers that culminated with a 
tripartite protocol on wages and prices in 1993.
Under the 1993 Wage and Price Protocol, 
workers and unions assented to a one-time cut in 
real wages of about 9 percent and agreed to keep 
their demands for future pay raises in line with 
increases in productivity. Firms promised to 
moderate their price increases, the government 
maintained the parity of the currency, and all 
parties agreed to the creation of a national pro-
ductivity board to provide better data on which 
to base future negotiations. 
To be sure, the protocol involved costly 
bargaining. When negotiations began, public 
demonstrations broke out and the government’s 
wage-cut proposal was challenged in court, all 
the way up to the Privy Council (Alvin Wint 
Table 2—Economic Policy and Performance in Barbados and Jamaica Diverge after 
1973
Barbados Jamaica
1966–1972 1973–1980 1962–1972 1973–1980
Growth rate of GDP per capita 6.0  2.7 4.2 −4.3
Fiscal deficit, percentage of GDP 2.7  5.3 2.3 15.5
Inflation 6.0 14.8 4.4 23.0
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2004, ch. 3). Nevertheless, the center held. 
The fall in real wages helped restore exter-
nal competitiveness and profitability, thereby 
achieving the same result as a devaluation but 
without the risk of triggering an inflationary 
spiral. The economy recovered quickly. From 
1993 to 2000 GDP per capita grew by 2.7 per-
cent per year. 
Unlike Barbados, Jamaica devalued its cur-
rency several times between 1975 and 2002. 
From this fact, many observers draw the spe-
cious conclusion that the difference in exchange 
rate policy accounts for Barbados’s superior 
economic performance1. But Barbados’s fixed 
exchange rate did not cause its economy to 
outperform Jamaica’s. Rather, the proximate 
source of Barbados’ superior performance was 
a set of growth-facilitating policies—monetary 
restraint, fiscal discipline, openness to trade, 
and ultimately wage cuts to restore competi-
tive unit labor costs—that had the side effect 
of enabling the monetary authority to maintain 
the exchange-rate parity without losing external 
competitiveness. In contrast, Jamaica’s policies 
were never consistent with maintaining commit-
ment to any parity the government might have 
wanted to adopt.
The differences in exchange rate policy do, 
however, raise an important issue. Faced with a 
scenario like that of Barbados in 1991, would 
Jamaica be able to achieve the social consen-
sus needed to adopt the measures required to 
avoid a competitive devaluation? As stated in 
the previous paragraph, we think the Jamaican 
record speaks for itself. Answering the deeper 
question—why do some democratic societies 
(of which Barbados is just one example) manage 
to reach constructive policy compromises while 
others (such as Jamaica) do not?—remains an 
important research challenge.2
V. Conclusion
It may be tempting for readers to regard this 
paper as a quaint tale of two exotic islands 
better known for their beaches, music, and 
Olympic sprinters than their significance 
1 Hon. Edward Seaga, “The Caribbean Single Market: 
Beneficial Path or Wayward Journey,” Jamaica Observer, 
February 10, 2006.
2 See Donald Robotham (1998) for clues about answers 
to this question for Barbados and Jamaica.
in the global economy. On the contrary, we 
think that important general lessons lie at the 
heart of this Caribbean parable. Recent work 
focuses on the very long-run effects of insti-
tutions to the point of exclusion of almost all 
other factors. But the macroeconomic deci-
sions of governments can exert just as much 
influence on the trajectory of the economy 
as the institutional  framework within which 
those decisions take place. Countries have no 
control over their geographic location, colo-
nial heritage, or legal origin, but they do have 
agency over the policies that they implement. 
Of particular importance for small open econ-
omies (i.e., most countries in the world) is the 
response of policy to macroeconomic shocks 
such as a fall in the terms of trade. Pedestrian 
as it may seem, changes in policy, even those 
that do not have a permanent effect on growth 
rates of GDP per capita, can have a significant 
impact on a country’s standard of living within 
a single generation.
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